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I. INTRODUCTION
Vessel tracking technology is currently in the vanguard of global
economic sanctions enforcement and compliance initiatives. As multilateral
actors and governmental authorities focus on maritime activities as a key
component of sanctions strategy, the shipping industry is in the crosshairs of
intense regulatory scrutiny.1 Since the consequences of running afoul of
sanctions are severe—civil penalties, blacklisting, and even vessel or cargo
seizure and forfeiture—commercial maritime actors have been forced to
quickly adapt as trade rules evolve under the pressures of mercurial
geopolitical developments.
Risking the consequences, some nefarious actors continue to utilize
maritime assets for illicit sanctions-busting trades.2 To circumvent sanctions,
these vessel operators engage in deceptive practices designed to conceal their
activities.3 Through a technique known as “going dark,” they deactivate or
manipulate their vessels’ mandatory tracking systems to disguise their
locations, launder their identities, and obfuscate the nature of the transactions
they perform.4 Law enforcement entities have monitored the world’s oceans
for such violations, citing suspicious vessel tracking transmissions as
evidence of malfeasance.5 Sanctioning authorities have also advised the
private sector to implement technology-driven compliance tools and risk
mitigation processes to avoid inadvertently violating sanctions.6 This is
requiring the shipping industry to examine the details of their business
dealings more forensically through vessel vetting and counterparty due
diligence.7
The international vessel monitoring framework finds its origins in
1
Sanctioning authorities include multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations and
European Union, or national governments willing to act on their own. The maritime aspects
of contemporary sanctions are discussed infra in Part III.
2
For a review of recent maritime sanctions circumvention tactics linked to North Korea,
see generally Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1874 (2009), transmitted by Letter dated 2 March 2021 addressed to the President
of the Security Council, ¶¶ 17-40, U.N. Doc. S/2021/211 (Mar. 4, 2021) [hereinafter Final
Rep. of Experts], https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2021_211.pdf (Mar. 4, 2021).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See infra Part III(A).
6
See infra Part III(B). See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Dep’t of State, and Coast Guard,
Sanctions Advisory for the Maritime Industry, Energy and Metal Sectors, and Related
Communities (May 14, 2020) [hereinafter U.S. Sanctions Advisory].
7
These vetting requirements are akin to the “know your customer” (KYC) inquiries that
have become common in the banking and finance sector for compliance with laws relating to
sanctions, terrorism financing, and money laundering. See, e.g., The KYC Process Explained,
SOC’Y FOR WORLDWIDE INTERBANK FIN. TELECOMM. (SWIFT), https://www.swift.com/yourneeds/financial-crime-cyber-security/know-your-customer-kyc/kyc-process (last visited Feb.
15, 2022).
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efforts to ensure navigational safety, but the recent pivot to enhance maritime
sanctions has transformed this infrastructure into a transparency apparatus.
To examine this phenomenon, this paper first describes the regulatory
background that led to mandatory vessel tracking under international law,
and analyzes its transformation into a sanctions tool. The paper then explores
the ways in which vessel tracking data analytics and artificial intelligence are
fueling innovative surveillance-focused commercial compliance products
and risk mitigation efforts. Finally, it evaluates the viability of the current
approach and, looking ahead, calls into question the reliance on voluntarily
transmitted vessel tracking data subject to manual switch-off.
II. VESSEL TRACKING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Contemporary vessel tracking flows from treaties designed to protect
life at sea. The invention of the radio in the late nineteenth century created
the technical capabilities for ships to wirelessly relay distress signals across
relatively long distances.8 After the tragic sinking of the RMS Titanic in 1912,
major seafaring nations soon mobilized to incorporate these tools into a
comprehensive navigational safety framework reflected in the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1914.9 SOLAS 1914
codified processes for the merchant shipmaster to relay danger and distress
alerts to other ships and to shore “by all the means of communication at his
disposal.”10 This treaty, however, only required ships to be fitted with a
“radiotelegraphic installation” if they carried at least fifty people on board.11
Other ships were only required to carry rudimentary tools for distress alerts,
such as “a Morse signaling lamp of sufficient range.”12
Bolstered by further innovations developed during the two world wars
and the creation of multilateral institutions in their aftermath, the
international community eventually formed a more complete regulatory
structure operationalizing new technologies for coordination on maritime
safety.13 The establishment of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization—the predecessor to the International Maritime Organization
(IMO)—also provided the shipping community a platform for further
8
Prior to the widespread use of radio technology, ships depended on visual signals such
as flags and lights, or audible devices such as fog horns, whistles, and bells.
9
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1914, Jan. 20, 1914 [hereinafter
SOLAS 1914].
10 Id. art. 8.
11 Id. art. 31. Article 35 requires that these radiographic installations be capable of
transmitting “clearly perceptible signals from ship to ship over a range of at least 100 sea
miles.”
12 Id. art. 9.
13 Even in the interwar period, SOLAS was updated to better facilitate radio-based alert
signals. SOLAS 1929 requires all ships engaged on international voyages to carry radiographic
installations, except those less than 1,600 gross tonnages. See International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea 1929, UKTS 43, May 31, 1929, Chapter IV, Article 27.
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harmonized regulation. Through these auspices, SOLAS was updated in
1960, and once again in 1974, producing a treaty text designed to promote
maritime safety through detailed provisions articulating minimum standards
for vessel construction and operation, as well as safety equipment that must
be carried on ships at sea.14
The original text of SOLAS 1974 contains explicit carriage
requirements, including maritime monitoring tools relying on enhanced
communication and data exchange between ships and shore. Among these is
a requirement that qualifying vessels be fitted with a Very High Frequency
(VHF) “radiographic station” and “radiotelephone station” capable of
sending and receiving danger and distress communications across designated
channels.15 The original SOLAS 1974 also requires certain “shipborne
navigational equipment” to be carried on vessels, including radar systems,
echo sounding devices, and various other technologies of the era.16 Some of
these items referenced in the SOLAS 1974 text are now technologically
obsolete, but in the decades following its entry into force, amendments have
been added by way of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee in accordance
with the procedures laid out in Article VIII.17 Through this flexible
amendment process, the IMO has repeatedly updated SOLAS 1974 to fulfill
maritime safety goals through increasingly sophisticated vessel tracking
processes as new technologies have emerged.
A. Global Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS)
Under the original SOLAS 1974 text, along with corresponding
language found in the International Convention on Maritime Search and
Rescue 1979 (SAR Convention), both national coast guards and private
commercial vessel operators are obliged to observe designated radio
frequencies for distress signals relayed by other ships.18 But since
conventional radio transmissions have limited working range in part due to
the curvature of the earth’s surface, vessels operating at sea often filled the
role of tracking distress signals and providing assistance.19 The advancement
14 See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1960, UKTS 60, May 31,
1960; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, 1184 UNTS 3, Nov. 1,
1974, [hereinafter SOLAS 1974].
15 SOLAS 1974, Chapter IV.
16 Id. Chapter V.
17 Article VIII directs amendments proposed by a contracting government to be “referred
to the Maritime Safety Committee of the Organization for consideration.” Contracting
governments may participate in the proceedings considering the adoption of amendments,
which requires a two-thirds majority of the contracting governments present and voting. Id.
18 See International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1405 UNTS 97, adopted
April 27, 1979, entered into force June 22, 1985 [hereinafter SAR Convention]; see also IMO
Maritime Safety Committee, Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea,
MSC.167 (78) (May 20, 2004).
19 See Denise Brehaut, GMDSS: A USER’S HANDBOOK 11 (5th ed., Bloomsbury
Publishing 2013).
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of telecommunications capabilities through satellite technology altered this
dynamic, and ultimately led to SOLAS updates.20 In 1988, the IMO adopted
a revised SOLAS chapter to establish a Global Maritime Distress and Safety
System (GMDSS), which reimagined maritime safety responses utilizing
new technology.21 These GMDSS provisions mandate that every qualifying
ship carry radio equipment capable of performing enumerated functions
including transmitting and receiving ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore distress
alerts, signals for determining location, and other maritime safety
information.22 Relying on a combination of satellite and terrestrial
technologies, this new SOLAS regime transformed distress communications
from being primarily dependent on ship-to-ship radio transmissions to
instead extensively facilitate ship-to-shore messaging.23
From its inception, the technological operability of GMDSS has
depended on three types of equipment: transmitters carried on vessels
operating at sea, receivers housed in shore-based facilities, and geostationary
satellites moving in synchronous orbits more than twenty-thousand miles
above the earth.24 The GMDSS regulations require that vessels carry
emergency position indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) which relay homing
signals for location detection, navigational telex devices capable of
automatically receiving safety messages such as emergency meteorological
forecasts, and search and rescue transponders used to enhance tracking
through more precise location signals on a radar band.25
The GMDSS satellites are primarily monitored and controlled by the
London-based
International
Maritime
Satellite
Organization
(INMARSAT).26 INMARSAT satellites are assigned ocean region footprints,
and within the coverage of these overlapping sea areas distress
communications may be conveyed nearly anywhere in the world (with
20 Id. at 27-29; See also Arthur Alan Severance, The Duty to Render Assistance in the
Satellite Age, 36 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 377 (2006) (discussing the role of technology in the
development of GMDSS).
21 See SOLAS 1974, supra note 14, as amended, Chapter IV, Reg. 4. These GMDSS
requirements came into force on February 1, 1992.
22 Id. The SOLAS GMDSS provisions also require contracting governments to “ensure
that suitable arrangements are made for registering [GMDSS] identities and for making
information on these identities available to rescue co-ordination centers on a 24-hour basis.”
23 See
U.S. Coast Guard, Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=GMDSS.
24 See Brehaut, GMDSS: A USER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 12.
25 Id. at 98. Search and rescue transponders can be especially helpful to locate survivors
who have abandoned a sinking vessel.
26 Id. at 81. INMARSAT was originally established in conjunction with the International
Mobile Satellite Organization. It was later privatized but continues to provide infrastructure
for the operation of GMDSS. See David Sagar, INMARSAT, 14 INT’L J. OF MARINE AND
COASTAL L. 423 (1999). Note that EPIRBs interact with a different group of COSPASSARSAT satellites designed to provide broader coverage that include the polar regions. See
U.S. Coast Guard, Emergency Position Indicating Radiobeacon, https://www.navcen.uscg.
gov/?pageName=mtEpirb.
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certain parts of the polar regions being the possible exception).27 Recent
efforts to modernize GMDSS have also included the use of new satellites
managed by entities beyond INMARSAT. In 2018, the IMO Maritime Safety
Committee approved a new service provider called Iridium.28 Iridium has
described its satellites as offering more comprehensive GMDSS services
with “full coverage at even extreme latitudes.”29
In practice, GMDSS has allowed vessel operators to relay distress
signals to state-operated Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs), which the
SAR Convention tasks with the responsibility of coordinating rescue
responses.30 To fulfill this purpose, GMDSS data is collected by the IMOauthorized service providers and is then passed on to state authorities.31
GMDSS does not transmit vessel location information automatically; rather
it is subject to human operation through the initiation of a distress signal.32
This involves a vessel operator activating the system using the red pushbutton on the shipborne GMDSS equipment to relay a pre-formatted distress
alert, which transmits the message to the service providers.33 One problem
with this reliance on manual operation is that GMDSS has commonly been
subject to false positive signals.34 In the early years following its
implementation, the prevalence of false positives threatened to strain search
and rescue resources, although this problem has reportedly diminished with
modifications to newer equipment.35 Despite any shortcomings, the GMDSS
implementation represents a critical first wave in globally mobilizing
27 See Brehaut, GMDSS: A USER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 81; see also S.E. Doyle,
INMARSAT: The International Maritime Satellite Organization—Origins and Structure, 5 J.
OF SPACE L. 45 (1977).
28 See IMO Maritime Safety Committee, Statement of Recognition of Maritime Mobile
Satellite Services Provided by Iridium Satellite LLC, MSC.451(99) (May 24, 2018).
29 Ten Things to Know About GMDSS, IRIDIUM (July 12, 2018), https://www.iridium.com/
blog/2018/07/12/ten-things-know-gmdss/.
30 See SAR Convention, supra note 18, para 2; see also IMO Maritime Safety Committee,
Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, MSC.167(78) (May 20, 2004).
31 Note that GMDSS data is designed for government use to facilitate search and rescue,
and it is not designed to be made publicly accessible like AIS discussed infra in Part II(B).
32 EPIRBs are designed to activate automatically when immersed in water, but they can
be made inoperable by simply removing the battery or even wrapping the transponder in tin
foil—a possibility mentioned in IMO documents as necessary when a ship is scrapped after
the end of its useful life. See IMO General Assembly, IMO Guidelines for the Avoidance of
False Distress Alerts, Res A.814(19) (Nov. 23, 1995).
33 See Brehaut, GMDSS: A USER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 49. The GMDSS
equipment is capable of automatically transmitting the distress message, including vessel
location, via a Digital Select Calling (DSC) framework. To prevent false positive signals, new
equipment houses the distress button under a spring-loaded cover and requires the user to hold
the button for five seconds. Id. at 55.
34 See IMO Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue,
Completion of the Detailed Review of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System, NCSR
3/14 (Dec. 11, 2015) Annex 1, at 15.
35 See IMO Guidelines for the Avoidance of False Distress Alerts, supra note 32.
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satellite-based technology to promote maritime safety through enhanced
vessel location tracking.
B. Automatic Identification System (AIS)
The international harmonization of GMDSS technical requirements set
the stage for further vessel monitoring capacity. In 2000, the IMO Maritime
Safety Committee again adopted SOLAS amendments—this time updating
system and equipment carriage requirements for the purpose of aiding
navigation through automatic information exchanges.36 These provisions
require qualifying vessels to be “fitted with an automatic identification
system (AIS).”37 The amendments mandate that the AIS “provide
automatically” real-time information, including the vessel’s “identity, type,
position, course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related
information” which must be made accessible to other ships, aircraft, and
equipped shore-based facilities through transponders carried on board.38 The
AIS equipment must also be capable of automatically receiving such
information from other ships for the purpose of monitoring and tracking their
movements.39
The new SOLAS provisions also explain that AIS “shall be operated
taking into account the guidelines adopted by the [IMO].”40 Less than a year
after the IMO adopted the amendments, the IMO General Assembly issued
Guidelines for the Onboard Operational Use of Ship-borne Automatic
Identification Systems (AIS).41 These Guidelines were developed to promote
the efficacy of AIS and also to “inform the mariner about the operational use,
limits and potential uses of AIS.”42 They also clarify the objective of AIS is
“to enhance: safety of life at sea; the safety and efficiency of navigation; and
the protection of the marine environment” through vessel identification,
tracking, and information exchange.43
The AIS Guidelines, which were revised slightly in 2015, clarify its
technical requirements. The AIS should relay fixed information including the
36 Maritime Safety Committee, Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as Amended, MSC.99(73) (Dec. 5, 2000).
37 This provision requires, “all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on
international voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on
international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size be fitted with an automatic
identification system (AIS).” SOLAS 1974, supra note 14, as amended, Chapter V, Reg. 19,
para. 2.4.
38 SOLAS 1974, supra note 14, as amended, Chapter V, Reg. 19, para. 2.4.5; see also
International Maritime Organization, AIS Transponders, https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/
Safety/Pages/AIS.aspx.
39 AIS Transponders, supra note 38.
40 SOLAS 1974, supra note 14, as amended, Chapter V, Reg. 19, para. 2.4.5.7.
41 Int’l Maritime Org. Res. A.917(22), annex, U.N. Doc. A 22/Res17 (Nov. 29, 2001)
[hereinafter Original AIS Guidelines].
42 Id. para. 1.
43 Id. para. 4.
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IMO number, Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) number, and vessel
type and size; dynamic information such as vessel position and speed; and
voyage information such as the vessel draught and intended destination.44
The Guidelines explain that AIS utilizes radio waves sent through VHF
broadcasts to transmit messages in the maritime band.45 Some of these
messages, such as the vessel’s position and speed, are updated automatically
from the ship sensors, while other data is entered manually.46 Manual inputs
into the system may be entered by the vessel operator at the start of the
voyage or “whenever changes occur.47“ This manually entered data includes
the draught, departure time, expected destination arrival time, route plan, and
other information such as whether hazardous cargo is carried onboard.48 To
ensure the accuracy of the AIS data, the vessel operator is encouraged to
“carry out regular routine checks during a voyage to validate the accuracy of
the information being transmitted.”49
The AIS Guidelines also provide operational instructions. They
emphasize that some ships, such as leisure craft, warships, naval auxiliary
vessels, and small fishing boats do not carry AIS.50 For those vessels that are
subject to the AIS requirement, “AIS should always be in operation when
ships are underway or at anchor.”51 However, the AIS Guidelines also
indicate a limited exception to the continuous nature of the AIS requirement:
“[i]f the master believes that the continual operation of AIS might
compromise the safety or security of his/her ship or where security incidents
are imminent, the AIS may be switched off.”52 As an elaborating point, the
original AIS Guidelines note that “[t]his might be the case in sea areas where
pirates and armed robbers are known to operate,” although this illustrative
language is excluded in the revised AIS Guidelines.53 In any event, if the AIS
is switched off, the revised Guidelines highlight, “[t]he master should
however restart the AIS as soon as the source of danger has disappeared.”54
Due to this possibility of AIS switch-off, the AIS Guidelines also
caution vessel operators to “always be aware that other ships fitted with AIS
as a mandatory carriage requirement might switch off AIS under certain
circumstances” and, consequently, “the information given by the AIS may
44 Int’l Maritime Org. Res. A.1106(29), annex, U.N. Doc. A 29/Res.1106, paras. 12–13
(Dec. 2, 2015) [hereinafter AIS Guidelines].
45 Id. para. 8; see also United States Coast Guard, Automatic Identification System
Overview, (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISmain.
46 AIS Guidelines, supra note 44, paras. 12-13.
47 Id. para. 23.
48 Id.
49 Id. para. 27.
50 Id. para. 3.
51 Id. para. 22.
52 Id.
53 See Original AIS Guidelines, supra note 41, para. 21.
54 AIS Guidelines, supra note 44, para. 22.
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not be a complete picture of the situation around the ship.”55 While the
reasons for this inaccurate transmission may be based on the “professional
judgment of the master,” the Guidelines also note that it is possible that
“poorly configured or calibrated ship sensors” might lead to faulty
transmissions that are “dangerously confusing.”56
Shipping industry organizations with IMO consultative status, including
the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the International
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), appear to
have played a significant role in the development of the AIS Guidelines with
its AIS switch-off exception.57 Their submissions to the Maritime Safety
Committee support the adoption of provisions in the SOLAS amendments
and the corresponding AIS Guidelines allowing for AIS to be deactivated at
the shipmaster’s discretion. INTERTANKO argued in its submission that
“[d]ue to the type of information contained within a broadcast, by an AIS
Transponder, a Master should have the authority to turn off the transponder
when the Master thinks the safety of the ship could be affected by its
transmission.”58 INTERTANKO proposed that the Maritime Safety
Committee, “make a provision in the Guidelines for AIS Transponders
indicating that a Master is allowed to switch off the AIS transponder should
he consider the safety of the ship could be affected.”59 In a document
submitted on the same day, ICS, which proposed the original draft AIS
Guidelines for consideration by the Maritime Safety Committee SubCommittee on Safety of Navigation, also described the following as one of
the principles of its proposal: “if the master believes that the continual
operation of AIS might compromise the safety of his ship, he may switch the
AIS off at any time.”60
55

Id. paras. 33-34.
Id. para. 37.
57 See Maritime Safety Committee, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its
Seventy-Second Session, MSC 72/73 (May 31, 2000) paras. 10.21, 10.65-10.68; The
International Chamber of Shipping is a non-profit trade association made up of shipowners
and operators, describing itself as “the collective voice of the international shipping industry.”
It represents its membership as an advocate for “high operational standards and a regulatory
environment embracing safety, environment, open markets and fair competition.” See
International Chamber of Shipping, About ICS, https://www.ics-shipping.org/about-ics/;
INTERTANKO is a trade association representing the interest of its members who are
independent tanker owners. Its work is devoted to “a wide range of operational, technical,
legal and commercial issues affecting tanker owners and operators around the world.” See
INTERTANKO, About Us, https://www.intertanko.com/About-Us/.
58 See Maritime Safety Committee, Revision of Chapter V of SOLAS—Transponders:
Submitted by INTERTANKO, MSC 72/10/8 (Mar. 14, 2000), para. 5.
59 Id. para. 7.
60 See Maritime Safety Committee, Guidelines on Automatic Identification System (AIS)
Operational Matters: Note by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), MSC 72/10/12
(Mar. 14, 2000); see also Navigation Committee, Guidelines on Automatic Identification
System (AIS) Operational Matters: Note By the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS),
NAV, 46/10, (Mar. 20, 2000).
56
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AIS data has been utilized for research and regulatory purposes beyond
the original navigation-focused scope articulated in the text of the SOLAS
amendments. State actors have employed AIS data to surveil traffic for
maritime domain awareness purposes, including pollution prevention and
response, ballast water exchange, noise regulation, and protection of aquatic
life and vulnerable sea areas.61 In the years following the 9/11 attacks, AIS
was also re-directed as a tool to respond to maritime security vulnerabilities,
such as enhancing compliance with the new International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) code.62
AIS capabilities have also been enhanced through the use of satellite
technology by which space-based AIS receivers collect and report vessel
identification information in real time.63 This has broadened the possibilities
of vessel tracking for disaster response such as alerting vessels in the path
dangerous weather, enhancing search and rescue efforts in conjunction with
GMDSS equipment, and collecting evidence for the purpose of identifying
vessels responsible for incidents of ship-source marine pollution.64 Some
observers see this wide-ranging use of AIS data optimistically, while others
view its application through a more skeptical lens.65
But even as AIS has become a fundamental tool for maritime
monitoring, regulators, industry participants, and technical researchers alike
continue to recognize that AIS is not always reliable. As a self-reporting
system dependent on manual inputs, AIS remains notoriously susceptible to
unintentional human error and jamming.66 Since AIS relies on unencrypted
61

For an overview of these initiatives, see generally Melanie Fournier et al., Past,
Present, and Future of the Satellite-based Automatic Identification System: Areas of
Applications (2004-2016), 17 WMU J. OF MAR. AFFAIRS 311, 311-45 (2018); see also Martin
Svanberg, et al., AIS in Maritime Research, 106 MARINE POL’Y 103520 (2019).
62 See generally William R. Cairns, AIS and Long Range Identification & Tracking, 58 J.
OF NAVIGATION 181 (2005); Jay A. Creech & Joseph F. Ryan, AIS The Cornerstone of
National Security, 56 J. OF NAVIGATION 31, 31-44 (2003).
63 See J. Carson-Jackson, Satellite AIS—Developing Technology or Existing Capability?,
65 J. OF NAVIGATION 303, 304-07 (2012) (noting AIS was “never intended to be received by
satellites” and that authorities noticed that AIS carried “potential to support a wide range of
maritime regulatory and traffic monitoring activities and assist with maritime security”); see
also Athanassios Goudossis & Sokratis K Katsikas, Towards a Secure Automatic
Identification System (AIS), 24 J. OF MARINE SCIENCE & TECH. 410, 410-23 (2019) (discussing
new technologies that could reduce some of the security vulnerabilities of AIS).
64 See EunSu Lee et al., The Maturity of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and Its
Implications for Innovation, 7 J. OF MARINE SCI. & INNOVATION 287 (2019).
65 For an optimistic view see, e.g., Elizabeth Nyman, Techno-optimism and Ocean
Governance: New Trends in Maritime Monitoring, 99 MARINE POL’Y 30, 30-33 (2019). For a
more skeptical discussion, see, for example, Lorenzo Pezzani & Charles Heller, AIS Politics:
The Contested Use of Vessel Tracking at the EU’s Maritime Frontier 44 SCI., TECH., & HUM.
VALUES 881, 881-89 (2019).
66 See, e.g., Abbas Harait-Mokhtariet et al., Automatic Identification Systems (AIS): Data
Reliability and Human Error Implications, 60(3) J. OF NAVIGATION 373, 373-89 (2007); Jay
A. Creech & Joseph F. Ryan, supra note 62.
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VHF channels, it is also vulnerable to hacking, manipulation, and spoofing.67
Despite this evidence that the AIS-based information cannot be fully trusted,
its application continues to expand into new contexts.68
C. Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)
International maritime regulators have also expanded vessel tracking
requirements beyond AIS through a separate Long-Range Identification and
Tracking (LRIT) system. In 2006, the IMO Maritime Safety Committee once
again amended SOLAS to require qualifying vessels to “be fitted with a
system to automatically transmit” information including the ship’s identity,
its position, and the date and time of the message.69 This LRIT framework is
designed to provide for the global identification and tracking of ships,
whereby transmitting equipment carried on ships relays information to be
collected in an international LRIT data exchange accessible by flag states,
port states, coastal states, and search and rescue authorities.70
Unlike AIS, LRIT data is not relayed on a VHF band; instead, LRIT
utilizes the same equipment required to be carried on ships for the purpose
of the GMDSS (although this equipment must be slightly reconfigured).71
Due to this satellite-linked technology, LRIT is capable of automatically
transmitting the necessary information “without human intervention” at 6hour intervals.72 Although the data is automatically transmitted, LRIT still
relies on shipborne equipment and is therefore not “passive” like radar or
optical satellite-driven observation tools that might be able to track vessels
without the vessel operator’s participation.73 Instead, LRIT is described as a
“cooperative” system requiring interaction with the equipment carried on
vessels, the orbiting satellites, and designated shore-based data collection
67 The US Coast Guard also acknowledges this on its FAQ website: “AIS by design is an
open, non-proprietary, unencrypted, unprotected radio system, intended to operate on nonsecure VHF-FM channels. So technically it can be spoofed—so trust, but verify. Should you
encounter ghost or fake AIS targets, please report them to us.” See United States Coast Guard,
AIS Frequently Asked Questions https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISFAQ#1
(emphasis in original).
68 To address this informational integrity problem, researchers have attempted to measure
AIS signals to determine whether a gap in AIS indicates intentional manipulation or
unintentional technical failure. See Fabio Mazzarella et al., A Novel Anomaly Detection
Approach to Identify Intentional AIS On-Off Switching, 78 EXPERT SYS. WITH APPLICATIONS
110, 110-23 (2017).
69 See Maritime Safety Committee, Adoption of Amendments to the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as Amended, MSC.202(81) (May 19, 2006),
paras. 4-5.
70 Id.
71 Id. para. 4.
72 Id.
73 For an overview of the policy rationale driving the LRIT framework, see Jason M.
Krajewski, Out of Sight, Out of Mind? A Case for Long Range Identification and Tracking of
Vessels on the High Seas, 56 NAVAL L. REV. 219, 223 (2008).
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centers.74
One of the critical distinctions between LRIT and AIS is that the
information transmitted via LRIT is not intended to be relayed to other ships
or to the broader public. Instead, LRIT data is designed to be for government
use only, which may include various state actors such as the vessel flag state
administration, the port state the vessel operator has indicated as the intended
destination, or other coastal states within close range of the vessel. As these
authorized governmental entities access LRIT information, they are obliged
to “recognize and respect the commercial confidentiality and sensitivity of
any long-range identification and tracking information they may receive.”75
Despite their technical differences, LRIT is intentionally subject to
some of the same limitations as AIS. Even prior to its adoption, the IMO
determined that LRIT systems and equipment “shall be capable of being
switched off on board or be capable of ceasing the distribution of long-range
identification and tracking information” in certain circumstances.76 These
include “in exceptional circumstances and for the shortest duration possible
where the operation is considered by the master to compromise the safety or
security of the ship.”77 This LRIT switch-off possibility is a surprising choice
from a regulatory perspective, as the confidential nature of the LRIT data
exchange limits the scenarios where a shipmaster would need to deactivate
LRIT to avoid tracking by dangerous non-state actors such as pirates who in
theory should not have access to such data in the first place.78
The original purposes of LRIT are limited to maritime safety and
security issues, including enhancing search and rescue by improving the
GMDSS.79 But even during its development, there was an apparent intention
to utilize LRIT data to improve maritime domain awareness more
generally.80 After its adoption, the United States, for instance, immediately
implemented domestic regulations requiring a wide range of ships either
bound for a US port or traveling within 1,000 nautical miles from the US

74

Id. at 223.
See Maritime Safety Committee, Adoption of Amendments to the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as Amended, MSC.202(81) (May 19, 2006),
10.2.
76 Id. para. 7.
77 Id.
78 A counterpoint is that hostile state-affiliated actors may utilize access to confidential
LRIT data to target merchant ships. Such politically motivated attacks have unfortunately
occurred in recent years, which supports the position that merchant shipmasters should retain
some level of discretion to deactivate LRIT to avoid security risks. See, e.g., Patrick Kingsley
et al., Israel’s Shadow War with Iran Moves Out to Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2021; Courtney
McBride, U.S. Says Drone Fragments Recovered From Israeli-Linked Tanker Point to Iran’s
Role in Attack, WALL STREET J., Aug. 6, 2021.
79 See Maritime Safety Committee, Guidance to Search and Rescue Services in Relation
to Requesting and Receiving LRIT Information, MSC.1/Circ.1338 (Mar. 1, 2011).
80 See Krajewski, supra note 73, at 229.
75

232

Monitoring Sanctions Compliance at Sea
42:221 (2022)

coast to relay LRIT data for security surveillance.81 But LRIT, like AIS, has
also been used for the purpose of broadly enhancing maritime law
enforcement.82 In response to a significant uptick in maritime piracy
occurring off the coast of Somalia, the IMO Maritime Safety Committee
established a “distribution center” in 2010 for security forces operating in the
waters of the Western Indian Ocean, noting that “LRIT information could
provide a very useful source of data” for the security forces to build a
“holistic picture.”83 In establishing this new distribution center, the Maritime
Safety Committee recognized that although it is not part of the original LRIT
framework, the center is designed to “leverage the LRIT technical
architecture in order to accomplish its goal, without any prejudicial impact”
on the system.84
III. VESSEL TRACKING AND MARITIME SANCTIONS
Although mandatory vessel tracking processes imposed by the
international legal framework were built to facilitate safe and secure
navigation, over the years these tools—particularly AIS—have also been
used for intelligence gathering. This includes law enforcement efforts
attempting to address illegal fishing, environmental crimes, contraband
smuggling, piracy, and human trafficking.85 As sanctioning authorities have
increasingly zeroed-in on maritime transport as a means of strengthening the
impact of economic sanctions, they have also begun utilizing vessel tracking
tools for enforcement actions and referencing them in regulatory guidance.
The redirection of vessel tracking tools in the sanctions context has also
forced the shipping industry to bear a compliance burden that includes vessel
tracking to facilitate counterparty due diligence and contractual risk
mitigation efforts.
A. Enforcement Actions
Contemporary multilateral sanctions, such as UN-level trade
restrictions targeting North Korea, reflect a focused pivot to maritime
transport regulation. This technique is evident in the language of recent U.N.
Security Council Resolutions imposing maritime trade restrictions, such as
prohibitions on the export of coal out of North Korea and quotas limiting its
81 See 33 CFR Part 169; United States Coast Guard, Long Range Identification and
Tracking (LRIT) Overview, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=lritMain (last visited
Aug. 4, 2021).
82 See Maritime Safety Committee Res. 87/26/Add.1/Annex 15 (May 21, 2010).
83 Id.
84 Id.; see also Maritime Safety Committee Res. 83/28/Add.2/Annex 6 (Oct. 12, 2007)
(“Contracting Governments may request, receive, and use LRIT information for safety and
marine environment protection purposes.”).
85 See, e.g., Fournier et al., supra note 61; Svanberg et al., supra note 61; Creech & Ryan,
supra note 62.
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access to the import of petroleum.86 The dependence of these sanctions on
maritime industry participation is also reflected by compliance monitoring
initiatives administered under U.N. auspices. Recent reports of the U.N.
Panel of Experts tasked with tracking the effectiveness of North Korea
sanctions have described a series of deceptive maritime practices used to
conduct prohibited trades.87 Among these tactics are sophisticated ship
identity laundering techniques accomplished by disguising participating
vessels with fraudulent profiles involving the deactivation, manipulation, and
spoofing of AIS transmissions.88
Unilateral sanctions, especially those promulgated by the United States,
have also recently emphasized a strategy of regulating maritime transport to
pressure actors linked to North Korea, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and now also
Russia.89 These trade restrictions have been paired with the threat of civil
penalties, blacklisting, and secondary sanctions against those who do
business with Specially Designated Nations (SDNs). Enforcement measures
of this kind are primarily administered by the US Department of Treasury
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which keeps a list of SDNs,
including vessels, that the international trade community must consult for
sanctions compliance purposes, or otherwise risk the prospect of serious
fines.90 Press releases describing these enforcement actions have indicated
OFAC’s reliance on intelligence gathering that utilizes vessel tracking
technology for the purpose of discovering deceptive sanctions circumvention
86

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2397 (Dec. 22, 2017); S.C. Res. 2375 (Sept. 11, 2017).
See Final Rep. of Experts, supra note 2, ¶¶ 17-40; see also Midterm Report of the Panel
of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), transmitted by Note by the
President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 13–42, U.N. Doc. S/2021/777 (Sept. 8, 2021).
88 See Midterm Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874
(2009), transmitted by Note by the President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 13-42, U.N. Doc.
S/2021/777 (Sept. 8, 2021).
89 See, e.g., OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFAC
ADVISORY TO THE MARITIME PETROLEUM SHIPPING COMMUNITY: SANCTIONS RISKS RELATED
TO PETROLEUM SHIPMENTS INVOLVING IRAN AND SYRIA (2019); Treasury Targets Maritime
Entities for Supporting Illegitimate Maduro Regime in the Venezuela Oil Trade, U.S. DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, (June 2, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1022. At
the time of this writing, less than one month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, sanctions
applied to Russia-linked economic activities are evolving rapidly. The United States and other
governments have imposed wide-ranging sanctions impacting maritime activities; however,
multilateral sanctions from the U.N. Security Council are unlikely to materialize since Russia
is a permanent member with veto power. See e.g., Office of Foreign Assets Control, Issuance
of New Russia-related Executive Order and Related License 16 (Mar. 8, 2022), U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/
20220308; Fact Sheet: United States Bans Imports of Russian Oil, Liquified Natural Gas, and
Coal, (Mar. 8, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/
03/08/fact-sheet-united-states-bans-imports-of-russian-oil-liquefied-natural-gas-and-coal/.
90 See Office of Foreign Asset Control, Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons Lists (SDN) Human Readable Lists, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://
home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-designated-nationals-andblocked-persons-list-sdn-human-readable-lists.
87
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practices.91
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) has also increasingly played a role
in enforcing maritime sanctions, including the coordination of vessel and
cargo seizure and forfeiture.92 Intelligence gathering related to these actions
has focused on monitoring vessel movements primarily relying on AIS data.
In May 2019, the DOJ took the extraordinary step of seizing North Korea’s
second-largest bulk carrier, the M/V Wise Honest, in the territorial waters of
Indonesia.93 Indonesian authorities had detained the Wise Honest when it was
discovered drifting off its coast with deactivated AIS shortly after it had been
photographed loading illicit coal at a North Korean port. DOJ officials
secured a warrant from a U.S. magistrate judge to seize the vessel.94 After
executing the seizure with the aid of Indonesian authorities, DOJ officials
filed a civil complaint in the U.S. Southern District of New York alleging
that the Wise Honest was property subject to forfeiture under U.S. law.95 In
the complaint, the DOJ highlighted deactivated AIS as a red flag, describing
that “the fact that a vessel has turned off its AIS transmissions is typically
evidence of an attempt to avoid detection.” 96 On these grounds, the complaint
alleged the Wise Honest “attempted to conceal information about its location,
course, speed, or other navigational status while in the course of transporting
91 See, e.g., Office of Foreign Assets Control, Press Release: Treasury Announces Largest
North Korean Sanctions Package Targeting 56 Shipping and Trading Companies and Vessels
to Further Isolate Rogue State, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0297; see also U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY
OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, Press Release: Treasury Sanctions Shipping Companies
Transporting North Korean Coal, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Dec. 8, 2020), https://home.
treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0297; OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, Press Release:
Treasury Designates Vast Iranian Petroleum Shipping Network that Supports IRGC-QF and
Terror Proxies, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Sept. 4, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/
press-releases/sm767.
92 Other governments have engaged in similar enforcement measures when sanctionsbusting vessels have operated in their waters. See, e.g., Edna Tarigan, Indonesia Says It Has
Seized Iranian and Panamanian Tankers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 24, 2021,
https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-iran-f8f4b6889418e3ad9ef798bc52a80774; Yuna Park
& Hyunjoo Jin, South Korea Seizes Second Ship Suspected of Providing Oil to North Korea,
REUTERS, Dec. 31, 2017. Sanctioning authorities have already begun seizing Russia-linked
vessels, including merchant ships and private yachts. See, e.g., Pascal Rossignol, France,
Enforcing Sanctions on Russia, Seizes Ship in Channel, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-seizes-ship-suspected-violating-russiasanctions-official-2022-02-26/.
93 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Press Release: North Korean Cargo Vessel Connected to
Sanctions Violations Seized by U.S. Government, May 9, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/north-korean-cargo-vessel-connected-sanctions-violations-seized-us-government.
94 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture para. 45, United States of America v. The Bulk Cargo
Carrier Known as the “Wise Honest,” Bearing International Maritime Organization Number
8905490, No. 1:19-cv-04210 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (asserting that warrant authorizing seizure was
issued July 17, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1161356/download.
95 Id.
96 Id. para. 34.
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coal from North Korea to Indonesia.”97 Subsequently, U.S. officials worked
with Indonesian authorities to tow the Wise Honest to American Samoa,
where it was eventually sold.98
In a similar move in April 2021, the DOJ filed an action to enforce the
forfeiture of the tanker M/T Courageous on grounds that the vessel had been
involved in trades that violate North Korea sanctions.99 In its complaint, the
DOJ argued that the Courageous attempted to circumvent the sanctions by
concealing the nature of its activities. Under the heading, “M/T Courageous
Goes Dark,” the DOJ complaint read, “the fact that a vessel has turned off its
AIS transmissions is typically evidence of an attempt to avoid detection.”100
Since the Courageous turned off its AIS signal for a period of four months,
the DOJ argued, “[t]he disabling of AIS is consistent with other DPRKrelated efforts to avoid sanctions.”101
A slightly more complex case brought by the DOJ in 2021 involves
crude oil carried on the M/T Achilleas, which allegedly originated from oil
terminals in Iran to facilitate transactions involving sanctioned entities linked
to the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps.102 In the complaint, the DOJ cited
intelligence demonstrating a complex web of ship-to-ship transfers and AIS
manipulation leading to the sanctioned cargo being carried by the Achilleas.
The complaint alleged a tanker linked to Iran’s national tanker company, the
M/T Humanity, “spoofed” another vessel called the M/T Lubov by “assuming
[its AIS] parameters.”103 “Based on satellite imagery,” the DOJ alleged that
the Humanity “shut off her AIS transponder” and sailed along the Persian
97

Id. para. 36.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Press Release: Department of Justice Announces Forfeiture
of North Korean Cargo Vessel, Oct. 21, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departmentjustice-announces-forfeiture-north-korean-cargo-vessel. The proceeds from the sale were
reportedly transferred to the family of Otto Warmbier, an American college student who
suffered a fatal injury while in North Korean custody. This arrangement was made after the
Warmbier family filed an action in rem against the vessel to satisfy a judgment of $500 million
issued by the US DC District Court. See Seized North Korean Cargo Ship sold to Compensate
Parents of Otto Warmbier, Others, NAVY TIMES, Oct. 9, 2019, https://www.navytimes.com/
news/your-navy/2019/10/09/seized-north-korean-cargo-ship-sold-to-compensate-parents-ofotto-warmbier-others; Marisa Iati, Otto Warmbier’s Family is Suing for North Korean Coal
Ship Seized by U.S. Officials, WASHINGTON POST, July 6, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/2019/07/06/otto-warmbiers-family-is-suing-north-korean-coal-ship-seized-by-usofficials.
99 Complaint, United States of America v. The Tanker Vessel Known as the
“Courageous,” Bearing International Maritime Organization Number 8617524, No. 1:21CV-03636 (SDNY 2021).
100 Id. at 13.
101 Id. at 14.
102 United States’ Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem, United States v. All
Petroleum-Product Cargo Aboard the Achilleas with International Maritime Organization
Number 9398072, No. 1:21-CV-00305 (D.D.C. 2021), 2021 WL 386496.
103 The complaint defined AIS spoofing as “a technique where a ship manipulates its AIS
transponder to transmit false data such as a ship’s location or name.” Id. at 7.
98
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Gulf to “temporarily assume her new identity” as the Lubov.104 Meanwhile,
the real Lubov conducted a series of ship-to-ship transfers with other vessels
to load petroleum-product cargo “with her AIS transponder switched off.”105
Then the real Lubov engaged in a five day ship-to-ship transfer with the
Trident Liberty, which subsequently indicated via AIS data that it was fully
laden with two million barrels of oil.106 Several months later, the complaint
contended, the Trident Liberty transferred the illicit crude to the Achilleas via
ship-to-ship transfer in the Gulf of Oman.107 By tracking the cargo transfers
from the Lubov to the Trident Liberty and finally to the Achilleas, the DOJ
asserted that the cargo was sanctionable and subject to seizure.
Flag state registries around the world have also recently engaged in
sanctions enforcement by de-flagging ships that have performed sanctionsevading trades. In 2019, Panama, among the most popular flag registries in
the world, announced that it would withdraw its flag from any vessel that
violates sanctions.108 Other less-popular flag registries, including the Cook
Islands, Gabon, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Tanzania, have also de-flagged
vessels for isolated, sanctions-related offenses.109 These decisions were also
reportedly based on suspicious gaps in AIS transmission or AIS data
indicating participation in illicit ship-to-ship transfers.110 It is important to
recall, however, that certain flag states—namely open registries—are
sometimes managed by private business entities based in offices thousands
of miles from the geographic territory of the flags they represent.111
104

Id.
Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See Marianna Parraga & Elida Moreno, Exclusive: Panama to Withdraw Flags from
More Vessels that Violate Sanctions, REUTERS, July 12, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/
article/mideast-iran-tanker-panama-exclusive-idINKCN1U72E9; Alonso Illueca, On
Sanctions and Deregistration of Vessels: The Recent Practice of Panama, OPINIO JURIS, July
24, 2019, http://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/24/on-sanctions-and-deregistration-of-vessels-therecent-practice-of-panama.
109 See, e.g., Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Gabon Deflags Iranian Tanker, LLOYD’S LIST,
Feb. 11, 2020; Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Tanzania De-flags Tankers for ‘Illicit Transfers”
of Iranian Crude, LLOYD’S LIST, Oct. 27, 2020.
110 Id. These actions serve as counterpoint to criticism that “flags of convenience” are
complicit in sanctions circumvention. See, e.g., Christopher J. Watterson, Stephen Osborn, &
Samuel Grant, Open Registries as Enabler of Maritime Sanctions Evasion, 119 MARINE POL’Y
104090 (2020). Cameroon, Togo, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone are thought to be some of the
open registries allowing “subterfuge tankers” to operate under their flags. See Michelle Wiese
Bockmann, An Inconvenient Truth: Flags Failing, LLOYD’S LIST, Feb. 5, 2021.
111 For instance, the popular registries of Liberia and the Marshall Islands, are both based
in Virginia. See Liberian Registry, About the Liberian Registry, https://www.liscr.com/aboutliberian-registry (last visited Feb. 17, 2022); International Registries, Inc., About IRI,
https://www.register-iri.com/about-iri/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2022) (The flag registry of Gabon
is based in Amjan, United Arab Emirates). See Intershipping Services, LLC, About
Intershipping Services, http://www.intershippingservices.com/about-intershippingservices.
php.
105
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Consequently, these actors could have little connection to state intelligence
agencies and may need to rely on information from external investigations.112
In these monitoring and enforcement actions, authorities have
substantially relied on AIS data to track vessel movements and discover illicit
transactions at sea. By scrutinizing vessel tracking data for irregularities,
such as deactivation, manipulation, or spoofing, these authorities have
utilized information originally designed for navigational safety purposes to
facilitate sanctions surveillance and intelligence gathering. Remarkably,
however, in the publicly available documents describing these efforts, there
is scant reference to other data subject to the international legal framework
governing vessel tracking, such as data flowing from LRIT or GMDSScompliant equipment. While court documents do occasionally reference
satellite imagery to justify enforcement, details are limited regarding the
technical source of this data and whether it is open-source, commercially
available, or military grade.113
B. Regulatory Guidance
Recent maritime sanctions have generated nervous energy across the
shipping industry. Much of this buzz is driven by what industry participants
view as an uncomfortable call to action from regulators to shore up sanctions
compliance.114 During the last decade, U.N. Member States began sounding
the alarm that more shipping industry participation in sanctions monitoring
was necessary to verify the identities and activities of at-risk actors through
technology-driven screening.115 After the U.N. Security Council imposed
new rounds of economic sanctions pressure on North Korea in 2017 through
updated Resolutions adopting maritime restrictions, a subsequent U.N. Panel
of Experts Report urged shipping industry participants to engage in vessel
112

See Bockmann, Tanzania De-flags Tankers for ‘Illicit Transfers” of Iranian Crude,
supra note 109 (discussing letters sent to flag registries by NGO United Against a Nuclear
Iran indicating the findings of its own vessel tracking investigations).
113 Conventional law enforcement methods such as naval patrols continue to play a role in
sanctions compliance monitoring as well. See, e.g., United Kingdom Ministry of Defense,
Press Release: UK Conducts U.N. Sanctions Enforcement to Counter North Korea’s Weapons
Programmes (Sept. 26, 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-conducts-unsanctions-enforcement-to-counter-north-koreas-weapons-programmes (describing the use of
UK Navy frigates to track suspected vessels and collect video and photographic evidence of
ships breaching sanctions).
114 See Lloyd’s List, Shipping’s Compliance Risk Conundrum, May 21, 2021; Sebastian
Villyn, A Message to the Marine Insurance Market: Conduct Your KYC or Risk Fines,
LLOYD’S LIST, July 28, 2021.
115 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR., Letter Dated 15 January 2015 from the Permanent
Representatives of Australia and Singapore to the United Nations Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/28 (2015) at paras. 50-53 (recommending increased
due diligence efforts to ensure private sector sanctions compliance, including the commercial
use of vessel tracking via AIS-dependent monitoring, and the flag state use of INMARSAT
satellite-dependent tracking).
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tracking to support “far greater private sector due diligence, informationsharing and self-policing.”116 The U.N. Panel of Experts also recommended
that private shipping industry actors, including insurers, commodity traders,
and other members of the international trade community implement AIS
monitoring tools and verification measures.117
Since 2018, U.S. officials have also recommended shipping industry
participants, including shipowners, charterers, insurers, and others to
carefully examine the identity of counterparties and even track their vessel
movements.118 An already infamous May 2020 Sanctions Advisory, issued
jointly by the Department of Treasury, Department of State, and Coast
Guard, directs the private sector to bolster its compliance using
technology.119 This Sanctions Advisory urges the shipping community to
“adopt business practices addressing red flags and other anomalies that may
indicate illicit or sanctionable behavior.”120 These include the
implementation of “AIS best practices” such as, “researching a ship’s history
to identify previous AIS manipulation and monitoring AIS manipulation and
disablement when cargo is in transit” and also to “promote continuous
broadcasting of AIS throughout the life of the transaction.”121 The Sanctions
Advisory even suggests private industry participants “consider amending
contracts to make disabling or manipulating AIS for illegitimate reasons,
grounds for termination . . . if illicit sanctionable activity is identified.” 122
The Annex to the Sanctions Advisory is even more explicit on
recommendations for private sector vessel tracking. It urges marine insurance
companies to engage in compliance practices such as “[m]onitoring [AIS]
transmissions” to determine whether an insured vessel has “a pattern of
turning off AIS in a manner inconsistent with SOLAS” or “engaging in trade
to or from vessels that are not transmitting AIS consistent with SOLAS.”123
116 See Rep. of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), U.N.
Doc. S/2018/171, at 4 (Mar. 5, 2018). For an overview of these recommendations and the
impact on merchant shipping, see Richard L. Kilpatrick, Jr. North Korea’s Sanctions-Busting
Maritime Practices: Implications for Commercial Shipping, 37 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L
L. & AFF. 199 (2019).
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., OFAC North Korea Sanctions Advisory: Sanctions Risks Related to North
Korea’s Shipping Practices, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Feb. 23, 2018); OFAC Advisory to the
Maritime Petroleum Shipping Community: Sanctions Risks Related to Shipping Petroleum to
Syria, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Nov. 20, 2018); OFAC Advisory to the Maritime Petroleum
Shipping Community: Sanctions Risks Related to Petroleum Shipments Involving Iran and
Syria, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Mar. 25, 2019); North Korea Sanctions Advisory: Updated
Guidance on Addressing North Korea’s Illicit Shipping Practices (Mar. 21, 2019); OFAC
Advisory to the Maritime Petroleum Shipping Community, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Mar. 4,
2019).
119 U.S. Sanctions Advisory, supra note 6.
120 Id. at 3.
121 Id. at 4.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 9.
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It also recommends insurers engage in “pre-coverage” due diligence,
assessing the “AIS history of vessels that engage in potentially illegal
activities and operate in areas determined to be high-risk areas for sanctions
evasion.”124 It further recommends that commodity traders, suppliers,
brokers, vessel captains, and even crewing companies engage in at least some
form of AIS vetting, and advises shipowners, operators, and charterers adopt
an “AIS switch-off clause” that would allow them to terminate contracts if a
counterparty “demonstrates multiple instances of AIS manipulation that is
inconsistent with SOLAS.”125
Controversially, the Sanctions Advisory also encourages shipowners,
managers, and charterers, to continuously monitor vessels through means
that “include supplementing AIS with [LRIT] and receiving periodic LRIT
signals.”126 The Annex also goes further in recommending private actors
“consider using LRIT in addition to AIS and receiving LRIT signals every 3
hours.”127 Remarkably, the Sanctions Advisory and the Annex make no
mention of the confidential nature of LRIT data and do not explain how
private entities would be able to evaluate data that is designed for government
access only.128
A UK Guidance issued by the HM Treasury Office of Financial
Sanctions Implementation in December 2020 largely aligns with the U.S.
recommendations in citing AIS manipulation as a red flag for sanctions
violations and encouraging private sector participation in compliance
tracking.129 Although less comprehensive (and arguably softer in tone) than
the U.S. Sanctions Advisory on the issue of vessel tracking, the UK Guidance
provides that shipowners, charterers, insurers, flag registries, and port state
control entities “may wish to consider any benefits in AIS screening and the
inclusion of ‘AIS switch off’ clauses in contracts” for the purpose of due
diligence.130 The UK Guidance, however, is careful to emphasize that there
could be “legitimate reasons for AIS to be turned off or go dark” such as to
avoid the risk of piracy or due to technical connectivity problems.131 It also
diverges from the U.S. Advisory in that the UK Guidance does not mention
a private sector role in monitoring LRIT or other forms of vessel tracking.
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Id.
Id. at 18. The Advisory and Annex further encourage public authorities, including flag
state registries and port state control authorities, to utilize AIS monitoring. Id. at 11-14.
126 Id. at 5.
127 Id. at 18.
128 Id. LRIT monitoring is also encouraged for flag registry managers. Id. at 11-15.
129 See UK HM Treasury Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, Maritime
Guidance: Financial Sanctions Guidance for Entities and Individuals Operating within the
Maritime Shipping Sector (Dec. 2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/948299/OFSI_Guidance_-_Maritime_.pdf.
130 Id. at 8.
131 Id. at 3.
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C. Compliance Initiatives
These regulatory advisories demonstrate a current dependance on
private sector sanctions due diligence. But to accomplish this task,
commercial actors must have the tools. Ship monitoring websites such as
fleetmon.com, marinetraffic.com, and vesseltracker.com, which collect and
display AIS data, have long been popular for hobbyist ship watchers and
industry participants wishing to keep tabs on the movements of cargo.132
Although these tools were developed with broad transparency interests in
mind, the information that they display is not suited for the level of sanctions
due diligence required by regulators. Instead, the recent regulatory demands
have led to an impressive proliferation of new vessel tracking products
designed to help shipping industry participants track vessels for the purpose
of sanctions compliance through data collection, artificial intelligence, and
machine-learning analysis, re-packaged in user-friendly platforms.
Among these tracking products is the Lloyd’s List Intelligence
Seasearcher Advanced Risk & Compliance product.133 This platform is
marketed as utilizing machine learning to gain insight into vessel behavior
and detect “dark” port callings, ship-to-ship transfers, and AIS
manipulation.134 It is described as tracking AIS transmissions to look for
gaps, and then using artificial intelligence, it evaluates other relevant
variables such as high risk locations, distance traveled, and changes in the
vessel draught which might demonstrate undeclared loading or unloading.135
A recent Lloyd’s List report utilized this tool to help uncover deceptive
practices performed by a “subterfuge fleet” of more than 160 tankers used to
evade U.S. sanctions on petroleum products shipped out of Iran and
Venezuela.136
The Israeli company Windward is another provider selling digital
products for maritime sanctions compliance.137 Windward markets itself as a
132

See Fleetmon, About Fleetmon, https://www.fleetmon.com/company/our-story/;
Marine Traffic, About Us, https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/p/company; Vessel Tracker,
Innovation Since 2006, https://www.vesseltracker.com/en/static/about_vesseltracker.html.
133 See Lloyd’s List, Lloyd’s List Intelligence Unveils AIS Risk Analysis Platform, July 5,
2021,
https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1137446/Lloyds-List-Intell
igence-unveils-AI-risk-analysis-platform.
134 Lloyd’s
List Intelligence Seasercher Advanced Risk & Compliance,
https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/services/data-and-analytics/advanced-risk-andcompliance.
135 Id.
136 Richard Meade & Michelle Wiese Bockmann, The Sanctions-Skirting Secrets of
Shipping, LLOYD’S LIST INTELLIGENCE, July 2021, https://images.intelligence.informa.com/
Web/InformaUKLimited/%7Bc86d2824-6198-4660-85d0-2b7df5469ab3%7D_Sanctions_
Skirting_of_Shipping_Whitepaper.pdf; These tools have also uncovered similar tactics
adopted by actors seeking to circumvent the new Russia-related sanctions. See Michelle Wiese
Bockmann, Tankers Shipping Venezuela and Iranian Crude Switch to Russian Trade,
LLOYD’S LIST, June 8, 2022.
137 See Windward, About Us, https://windward.ai/company/about-us/.
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maritime risk management and intelligence company offering programs for
counterparty due diligence, including analysis of ownership structures and
vessel behaviors using AIS data and artificial intelligence.138 Its website
describes a “Know Your Vessel” product for sanctions compliance vesselvetting, using processes that “go beyond compliance risk” and “stay ahead of
emerging typologies and evolving trends with [] predictive insights.”139 This
is accomplished using machine learning to scrutinize vessel movements for
red flags.140 Although commercially available, Windward is also cited in
recent U.N. Panel of Experts Reports as one of its resources for investigating
North Korea sanctions circumvention.141
Some companies are offering products that focus on satellite imagery to
facilitate commercial intelligence for compliance purposes. Planet Labs
utilizes satellites to capture imagery that can be used to monitor maritime
spaces, detect vessels, and search for behavioral anomalies.142 It can also be
used along with AIS monitoring to observe sea areas where a vessel has
deactivated its AIS signal.143 Maxar Technologies offers a similar product,
although it is described as being less dependent on AIS transmissions.144 In
its marketing materials, Maxar Technologies has described its maritime
monitoring capabilities as providing “near-real-time” surveillance relying on
“space-based optical and radar imagery and advanced machine learning.”145
This includes the use of synthetic aperture radar technology, which has been
touted as having the capacity to recognize ships even in cloudy conditions.146
One of the more controversial approaches in maritime compliance data
mining is the potential private marketability of LRIT data. Although IMO
documents indicate LRIT data is designed to be accessible only by
138

Id.
See Windward, Know Your Vessel, https://windward.ai/solutions/know-your-vessel/.
140 Windward’s vessel-tracking technology has also received a patent from the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office. See USPTO Patent Number 10,922,981, Risk Event Identification in
Maritime Data and Usage Thereof (Feb. 16, 2021), https://uspto.report/patent/grant/
10,922,981.
141 See, e.g., Final Rep. of Experts, supra n. 2, at 17. IHS Markit is another company that
offers similar AIS screening products for sanctions compliance purposes utilizing data
collection and artificial intelligence. See IHS Markit, Risk & Compliance: Intelligent Solutions
for Trade Compliance, https://cdn.ihsmarkit.com/www/pdf/1021/705690708_RNC_
Intelligent-Solutions-for-Trade-Compliance_Oct-2021_Brochure_U1-lores.pdf.
142 Planet
Labs,
Maritime
and
Coastal
Monitoring
from
Planet,
https://www.planet.com/markets/maritime/; see also Robin Kraft, Experimenting with the
Deep Data Stack: Ship Counting, PLANET LABS, May 4, 2017, https://www.planet.com/pulse/
experimenting-with-the-deep-data-stack-ship-counting/.
143 Id.; See also Planet Labs, Planet Partners with SynMax to Provide Energy Intellegence
and Monitor Dark Vessels, April 18, 2022, https://www.planet.com/pulse/planet-partnerswith-synmax-to-provide-energy-intelligence-and-monitor-dark-vessels/.
144 See Maxar, Crow’s Nest Maritime Monitoring and Security, https://resources.maxar.
com/on-demand-intelligence/crows-nest-maritime-monitoring-and-security.
145 Id.
146 Id.
139
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governments, such as flag states or coastal states, the recent recommendation
from U.S. officials that private actors could use LRIT data to supplement AIS
tracking has challenged this interpretation.147 Shortly after the 2020 U.S.
Sanctions Advisory published such recommendations, representatives of UK
company Pole Star, which has managed LRIT data for major flag states such
as Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands, suggested that commercial
maritime actors may be able to purchase its data to ensure compliance with
maritime sanctions.148 In an interview with Lloyd’s List, the CEO of Pole
Star explained that its ship position reporting technology is “parallel” to the
LRIT data collection it performs for flag states.149 He also clarified that its
system, “is technically the same as LRIT but set up separately by Pole Star
using INMARSAT or Iridium [satellites] and therefore billed separately to
the commercial entity” that purchases the data.150 On Pole Star’s website, its
products are also described as utilizing INMARSAT satellite data capable of
providing ship location “even when its AIS is unavailable.”151 This practice
of distributing LRIT (or LRIT-parallel) data runs counter to the underlying
confidentiality concerns raised when LRIT amendments were added to
SOLAS, but at the same time it appears to facilitate the recommendations
contained in recent US regulatory guidance.152
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks have also
engaged in their own vessel tracking analysis using commercially available
intelligence gathering tools to support investigations on sanctions
compliance. Organizations such as the Washington D.C.-based Center for
Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) and the London-based Royal United
Services Institute (RUSI) have issued multiple reports describing North
Korea sanctions evasion tactics with a focus on deceptive maritime
activities.153 In its most recent report, C4ADS described a sophisticated
147

See discussion supra Part III(B).
See Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Government-only Vessel-tracking Data Up for Sale
‘with US Approval,’ LLOYD’S LIST, June 19, 2020, https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.
informa.com/LL1132749/Government-only-vessel-tracking-data-up-for-sale-with-USapproval.
149 Id.
150 Id. In response to the cited Lloyd’s List reporting, Pole Star CEO Julian Longson
published a right-of-reply highlighting “a number of serious inferences and regrettable choice
of words” that were used when describing the Pole Star products and protection of LRIT and
other similar data using the same technology. While Longson alleged the Lloyd’s List story
was “fake news,” he did not directly dispute any of the quotations contained in the story. It
appears that the point of contention is that Longson believes that Pole Star does not sell
privileged government data because the data sold to commercial entities is collected
separately.
151 See Pole Star, PurpleTRAC Update: Extending Your Sanctions Screening & Vessel
Tracking Capabilities (May, 26, 2021), https://www.polestarglobal.com/resources/purpletracupdate-extending-your-sanctions-screening-vessel-tracking-capabilities (last visited Nov. 3,
2021).
152 See discussion supra Part II(C) and Part III(B).
153 See, e.g., Lucas Kuo & Jason Arterburn, Lux & Loaded: Exposing North Korea’s
148
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process of vessel identity laundering demonstrated through analysis
depending on data collected by Windward, Planet Labs, Pole Star, and other
vessel tracking technology companies.154
Another NGO that has dabbled in sanctions compliance vessel tracking
in recent years is the group United Against a Nuclear Iran (UANI), which
describes itself as a “nonprofit and non-partisan policy organization.”155 To
fulfill its namesake agenda in pressuring Iran, UANI has tracked vessels
engaged in Iran-related sanctions circumvention, and describes its
methodology as using “AIS, satellite imagery, vessel comparison and tanker
classification, and cargo datasets.”156 UANI has used this information to
advocate for flag states and even private shipping industry participants to
avoid doing business with sanctions-busters. After reportedly receiving a
letter from UANI, which showed “satellite imagery” indicating Tanzaniaregistered vessels engaged in sanctions circumvention activities, Tanzania
de-flagged the tankers involved.157 Multiple P&I clubs also reportedly
cancelled membership of Iran-linked vessels after receiving similar letters
from UANI suggesting the vessels had spoofed AIS signals to circumvent
sanctions.158
D. Contractual Risk Allocation
Vessel tracking for commercial purposes has also moved beyond
counterparty vetting as shipping industry participants have also reacted to
regulatory guidance recommending the incorporation of monitoring
measures into commercial agreements. During the last decade, sanctions risk
in the maritime sector has already led hull insurers, P&I clubs, shipowners,
charterers, and financial institutions to develop sanctions clauses designed to
allocate the risk of sanctions exposure.159 But the recent regulatory push to
Strategic Procurement Networks, C4ADS (2019); Jason Byrne et al., Black Gold: Exposing
North Korea’s Oil Procurement Networks, C4ADS & RUSI (2021).
154 Andrew Boling, Unmasked: Vessel Identity Laundering and North Korea’s Sanctions
Evasion, C4ADS 2021; see also Anne Pellegrino, Planet’s Data Used to Reveal Illicit
Shipping Networks Delivering Fuel to North Korea in Violation of U.N. Sanctions, PLANET
LABS (last visited Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.planet.com/pulse/planets-data-used-to-revealillicit-shipping-networks-delivering-fuel-to-north-korea-in-violation-of-un-sanctions/;
see
also Natalia Dinsmore & Dror Salzman, North Korean Sanctions Evasion: Identity
Laundering Explained, https://windward.ai/blog/north-korean-sanctions-evasion-identitylaundering-explained/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2021).
155 See About UANI, UNITED AGAINST A NUCLEAR IRAN, https://www.unitedagainst
nucleariran.com/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2022).
156 See Iran Tanker Tracking, UNITED AGAINST A NUCLEAR IRAN, https://www.
unitedagainstnucleariran.com/tanker-tracker (last visited Feb. 18, 2022).
157 Id.
158 See Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Marine Insurers Cancel ‘Spoofing’ Iran-linked Ships,
LLOYD’S LIST, Oct. 4, 2021.
159 For a comprehensive discussion of these clauses, see generally Richard L. Kilpatrick,
Jr. “Maritime Sanctions Clauses” LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
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track vessels for sanctions compliance has further mobilized the development
of AIS switch-off clauses for the purpose of contractually addressing rights
and responsibilities relating to sanctions evasion red flags such as gaps in
AIS transmission or suspicious ship-to-ship transfers.
In July 2021, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)
published an AIS Switch Off Clause for Time and Voyage Charter Parties.160
The BIMCO background note to the clause explains that the reason for its
development flows from the publication of the U.S. and UK regulatory
guidance recommending that shipping industry participants utilize contract
clauses that provide grounds for termination when AIS has been deactivated
or manipulated. After consultation with industry actors attempting to comply
with these recommendations, BIMCO recognized that “ad hoc” AIS switchoff clauses were materializing on the market. While BIMCO has expressed
the opinion that “AIS as such is not a sanctions tool” and is instead designed
for navigational safety, concern about the “shortcomings of such ‘ad hoc’
clauses” led the BIMCO Documentary Committee to create its own standard
AIS switch off clause.161 This clause now adds to its growing menu of
BIMCO-endorsed sanctions clauses.162
The BIMCO AIS Switch Off Clause assigns warranties from both the
shipowner and charterer, which depend on compliance with the IMO AIS
Guidelines.163 The shipowner’s warranty provides in relevant part:
(b) Owners warrant that for the six (6) months prior to the arrival of
the Vessel at the first or sole loading port under this Charter Party and
throughout its duration they have not knowingly operated and will not
knowingly operate the Vessel’s AIS other than in accordance with the
Guidelines. This includes, but is not limited to, not manipulating,
knowingly switching off or otherwise disabling the Vessel’s AIS other
than in accordance with the Guidelines.164

The charterer’s warranty is relayed as follows:
565, 565-83 (2020).
160 BIMCO, AIS Switch Off Clause 2021, https://www.bimco.org/contracts-andclauses/bimco-clauses/current/ais_switch_off_clause_2021 [hereinafter BIMCO AIS Switch
Off Clause].
161 Id.; see also Mett Kronholm Fraende, BIMCO, The Severe Risks and Repercussions of
Switching Off the AIS, http://portfolio.cpl.co.uk/BIMCO/202106/security/ (quoting Grant
Hunter, then Head of Contracts and Clauses at BIMCO: “[t]he problem we have seen emerging
is that the AIS clauses that many have started adding to the contracts are badly drafted”).
162 See, e.g., BIMCO, Sanctions Clause for Time Charter Parties 2020; BIMCO, Sanctions
Clause for Voyage Charter Parties 2020; BIMCO, Sanctions Clause for Container Vessel
Time Charter Parties 2021.
163 The Clause clarifies the “‘Guidelines’ means the IMO Revised Guidelines for the
Onboard Operational Use of Shipborne Automatic Identification Systems, Resolution
A.1106(29) or any subsequent amendment thereto.” BIMCO AIS Switch Off Clause, supra
note 160.
164 Id.
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(e) Charterers warrant that throughout the duration of this Charter
Party they shall not:
(i) request Owners to operate the Vessel’s AIS other than in
accordance with the Guidelines. This includes, but is not limited
to, manipulating, switching off or otherwise disabling the Vessel’s
AIS other than in accordance with the Guidelines; or
(ii) give orders to conduct a ship-to-ship cargo transfer (STS) with
a vessel whose AIS has not been operated in accordance with the
Guidelines throughout the last six (6) months prior to the orders.165

If the charterer “reasonably believes” the shipowner has breached its
warranty, the charterer “shall request” the shipowner explain the apparent
breach, which triggers 72 hours to respond.166 If indeed the shipowner has
breached the warranty, the charterer has the right to terminate the
charterparty.167 At the same time, in the case of a charterer warranty breach,
the shipowner may reject the request, terminate the charterparty, and claim
damages resulting from the breach.168
The BIMCO Guidance Notes to the clause explain that if the AIS is not
transmitting, this does not necessarily mean that the shipowner is in breach
of its warranty.169 For instance, if the AIS is switched off for purposes
consistent with the IMO AIS Guidelines, such as to protect against the threat
of piracy, there is no breach.170 Likewise, there is no breach if the AIS is
switched off for a legitimate purpose and accidently left deactivated after
departing a high-risk area, if the AIS is switched off when the ship operator
wrongfully believes it is permitted to do so under the IMO AIS Guidelines,
or if the AIS equipment malfunctions.171 Instead, to establish a breach, the
charterer must demonstrate that the AIS was switched off “knowingly” for
the purpose of evading sanctions.172
To facilitate information gathering about a possible breach, the charterer
is granted the right to request information from the shipowner. The purpose
of this part of the clause is to facilitate communication in certain situations,
such as when the charterer receives information from a third-party vessel
tracking company that there has been a suspicious AIS switch off.173 But the
Guidance Notes clarify that this does not grant the charterer the right to
demand information from the shipowner each time AIS is not transmitted
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
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because it would be “too cumbersome.”174 Nevertheless, if a third-party
service provider reports that the vessel operator has engaged in AIS
manipulation, the charterer has a contractual right to request compliance
assurance. In asserting a breach, the charterer does not have to establish a
pattern of AIS manipulation or deactivation since even a singular violation
could expose the charterer to sanctions liability.175
Since the charterer’s warranty also includes an obligation to ensure it
does not give vessel orders to engage in ship-to-ship operations involving
other vessels that have failed to properly maintain AIS transmission in the
six months prior to the transaction, this places a substantial burden on the
charterer to investigate the AIS backgrounds of STS counterparty vessels
prior to any transaction. In a nod to contemporary tracking products available
for this purpose, the BIMCO Guidance Notes also emphasize that “[v]arious
AIS tracking providers and sanctions screening services offer reports on the
AIS activity of vessels.”176
Outside of the vessel chartering context, other maritime industry actors
have also addressed the contractual implications of AIS switch-off. The
International Group of P&I Clubs, representing thirteen of the most wellregarded P&I insurers around the world, has issued a circular to its members
describing efforts to introduce a common vessel tracking approach utilizing
“commercial providers to track the movements of their entered vessels” to
ensure compliance with regulatory guidance.177 The circular also
acknowledges the limitations associated with AIS-based tracking,
highlighting that “routine monitoring of a vessel’s AIS transmissions is not
a complete answer when it comes to identifying potential evasion activity.”178
Some of these P&I clubs have also issued separate circulars addressing the
contractual consequences of AIS switch-off by explaining to their members
that deactivating AIS without a legitimate reason could lead to a breach of
P&I club rules.179
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Id.
Id. at guidance note to subclause (d).
176 Id. at background note.
177 See International Group of P&I Clubs, Vessel Monitoring and P&I Insurance—Ship’s
Automated Information System (AIS) (May 20, 2020), https://www.igpandi.org/article/theinternational-group-clubs-discuss-the-importance-of-ships-complying-with-the-requirementto-use-a-ships-automated-information-system-ais; International Group of P&I Clubs,
Sanctions—Recent Deceptive Practices (Feb. 2, 2022), https://static.igpandi.org/igpi_
website/media/adminfiles/Sanctions_Recent_Deceptive_Practices.pdf.
178 Id.
179 This could be based on an explicit sanctions clause contained in the P&I club rules or
on broad provisions prohibiting imprudent and unlawful trading. See, e.g., North of England
P&I Club, Sanctions: A Guide for Owners and Charterers, at 17 (May 2021); Irene
Anastassiou, Going Dark is a Red Flag—AIS Tracking and Sanctions Compliance, GARD,
May 29, 2019.
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E. Looking Ahead
Vessel tracking data is currently being used as a regulatory weapon and
a compliance shield in the sanctions space. These efforts, however, are
heavily dependent on AIS data, which belies its well-known technical
vulnerability and dependance on the human element in the form of
voluntarily transmitted information amenable to manual switch-off. As AIS
fills this improvised role as the fulcrum of various maritime sanctions-related
initiatives, this is leading to a search for other options that would be better
suited in the push for vessel location transparency.
One possibility is the further utilization of LRIT data or other
information that could be relayed from GMDSS-compliant equipment
already carried on vessels.180 While more secure than AIS, LRIT data is not
regularly cited in law enforcement documents as a basis for demonstrating
sanctions-busting trades, suggesting it may be underutilized by the regulators
authorized to access this information. Remarkably, however, as U.S. officials
have instead encouraged private sector actors to examine LRIT data for
sanctions due diligence, this has opened the door to the potential of new
possibilities for analytics that could enhance privately administered vessel
tracking. As these options are evaluated, LRIT’s current dependance on
human operation could still limit its effectiveness. As with AIS, vessel
operators maintain both the technical capability and legal authority to
deactivate LRIT transmissions at their discretion to avoid maritime security
risk. Consequently, even though LRIT is technically less vulnerable than
AIS, the possibility of LRIT switch-off dampens the prospect that it is
equipped for sanctions monitoring in its current iteration.
The LRIT technical and legal architecture, however, does not have to
remain static. The international community, under IMO auspices, already
managed to modify GMDSS equipment to facilitate the original LRIT
system, which suggests additional upgrades might be possible. For instance,
if LRIT equipment is converted to perpetually relay vessel location data, and
perhaps even preclude the possibility of manual switch-off, this could
potentially enhance vessel tracking without the need for major infrastructure
reform. If such options are pursued, the SOLAS framework would also need
to be reimagined in the interest of transparency, which might limit vessel
operators’ flexibility in deactivating LRIT transmissions. Changes of this
kind would require buy-in from corners of the maritime community that have
previously voiced concerns about the confidentiality interests and security
vulnerabilities related to continuous LRIT data transmissions.181
180 Others have also advocated for more focus on LRIT data for sanctions monitoring. See
Anastassios Adamopoulous, States Must Do More on Sanctions Compliance, LLOYD’S LIST,
Sept. 9, 2019.
181 One solution could be for regulators to re-affirm that LRIT data is for governments
only, which would preclude the possibility of LRIT or LRIT-parallel distribution through
commercially available platforms. If the concern about perpetual LRIT transmission is that
this could cause a vessel to be exposed to threats such as piracy, maintaining a bar on public
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Other recently proposed vessel tracking solutions include methods
utilizing satellite images and artificial intelligence analysis with less
dependance on data relayed by equipment carried on vessels.182 One team of
product developers described their process as follows: after detecting ships
from the skies using optical satellite imagery, or more advanced cloudpiercing synthetic aperture radar imagery, with the aid of machine learning,
metadata from these images is then analyzed using complex geospatial
analysis to pinpoint vessel locations.183 Ships detected through this process
are then cross-referenced with AIS data to create a database pairing their
physical characteristics with this identifying information.184 While the
accurate identifying data must be relayed at some point, either before or after
the images are analyzed, the image-based vessel tracking process does not
depend on a continuous AIS feed.185 The product developers have described
this process as “facial recognition” or “fingerprinting” for ships that could
one day function for various enforcement or compliance purposes, including
sanctions monitoring.186 At present, however, such products have not yet
come to market due in part to limited access to real-time high-resolution
satellite imagery.187 Although the technological capabilities exist to perform
this imagery-based vessel tracking analysis, the data access necessary for
product functionality is not yet available, or at least is not feasible from a cost
perspective.188
An additional variable to consider for the future of vessel tracking
discourse is the ongoing development of vessel automation and its
dependance on improved navigational technology. Currently, vessels with
varying degrees of autonomy, including remotely controlled and even fully
autonomous unmanned vessels are being tested. These vessels are expected
to utilize cutting-edge navigation, vessel monitoring, and collision avoidance
systems.189 If autonomous vessels are to one day become a viable part of
access to LRIT data could help allay this fear. That said, if LRIT data remains for government
eyes only, this might limit its usefulness for the type of private sector self-policing and
sanctions due diligence currently recommended by sanctioning authorities.
182 See, e.g., Michael S. Treacy & Mitchell B. Mikinski, Presentation: Ship Identification
and AI, Disruptive Technologies in International Law Conference, held by the Stockton
Cennter for International Law at U.S. Naval War College (Dec. 10, 2020).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. Other similar possibilities based on technological advancements in synthetic
aperture radar have been raised in academic literature. See, e.g., Zhi Zhao et al., Ship
Surveillance by Integration of Space-borne SAR and AIS—Review of Current Research, 67 J.
OF NAVIGATION 177-189 (2014); Sudhir Kumar Chaturvedi et al., Ship Recognition by
Integration of SAR and AIS, 65 J. OF NAVIGATION 323, 323-37 (2012).
189 Some observers have argued that autonomous shipping could significantly enhance
maritime safety. See, e.g., Jiri de Vos et al., The Impact of Autonomous Ships on Safety at
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international maritime operations, this is likely to require that at some stage
vessel tracking improve well beyond the current processes that rely on
unstable voluntarily transmitted data transmission that can be switched off at
the whim of the shipmaster.190 As the regulatory framework surrounding
maritime automation evolves parallel to emerging technologies, this could
offer an opportunity to create a new vessel location transparency standard,
and perhaps even eventually retire today’s concept of AIS or LRIT switchoff monitoring.191
With maritime sanctions in vogue as a geopolitical tool, regulators
interested in sanctions enforcement, along with the commercial actors tasked
with compliance, will need to adapt with these new technologies. Although
currently available tools include helpful AIS-dependent surveillance
platforms, this could be a temporary phenomenon as more reliable options
come onto the scene. As they do, this could translate into updated regulatory
guidance potentially citing new vessel tracking tools as necessary for
sanctions due diligence purposes, which may then be mirrored by
commercial agreements reflecting contractual risk allocation beyond the AIS
switch-off clauses that have recently circulated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although driven by policy underpinnings to promote safe and secure
navigation, the tools built under the international legal framework governing
vessel tracking have been funneled into a new purpose of effectuating
sanctions enforcement and compliance. At present, AIS, even with its wellknown vulnerabilities, is the primary mechanism being used by regulators
and compliance-attuned commercial actors. As sanctioning authorities push
for more private sector coordination on vessel-vetting and counterparty due
diligence in the sanctions space, technology-driven compliance products are
attracting widespread attention as they attempt to promote transparency in a
shipping industry that has long been criticized as opaque. But even as vessel
tracking improves with data layering, machine learning, and artificial
intelligence, the continued dependance on AIS challenges the notion that the
Sea—A Statistical Analysis, 210 RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY 107558 (2021); for an
overview of new technological developments impacting the shipping industry more generally,
see Baris Soyer & Andrew Tettenborn, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
SHIPPING LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2020).
190 This may include vessel data capture, recording, and storage to aid incident and
accident investigations. For a discussion on these possibilities, see Maritime UK, MARITIME
AUTONOMOUS SHIP SYSTEMS, MASS UK Industry Conduct Principles and Code of Practice,
Volume 5, at 88 (Nov. 2021), https://www.maritimeuk.org/priorities/innovation/maritime-ukautonomous-systems-regulatory-working-group/mass-uk-industry-conduct-principles-andcode-practice-2021-v5/.
191 The IMO has already recognized the implications that autonomous shipping may have
on SOLAS and other maritime conventions. See, e.g., Maritime Safety Comm., Outcome of
the Regulatory Scoping Exercise for the Use of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS),
MSC.1/Circ.1638 (June 3, 2021).
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transparency revolution has already arrived. Instead, it is the next wave of
technologies including those driven by satellite imagery recognition and
vessel automation that are more likely to illuminate the dark side of the
shipping industry. These emerging tools may support efforts to monitor
sanctionable activity in the current geopolitical climate—with the new
Russia-related restrictions representing an extraordinary inflection point—
and perhaps also offer opportunities to track compliance with other
regulatory obligations looming on the horizon.192

192 These forthcoming regulatory developments include shipping decarbonization efforts.
For a discussion on this trend and its connection to transparency initiatives, see LLOYD’S LIST,
TRANSPARENCY IN SHIPPING: A SPECIAL (2021), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.infor
ma.com/Special-report-Transparency-in-shipping. Maritime analytics companies have
already begun marketing their products as a means to track compliance with environmental
commitments. See, e.g., THE WINDWARD BLOG, Introducing Windward’s Data for
Decarbonization Program (Sept. 14, 2021), https://windward.ai/blog/introducing-windwardsdata-for-decarbonization-program/.
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